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Justin Lee Pedersen entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession
of a controlled substance, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to
suppress. He appeals from the district court's Judgment of Conviction.
Mr. Pedersen asserts that his right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures, protected by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and
Article I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, was violated because law enforcement officers
conducted a search of his jacket 1 without a warrant and in the absence of any valid
exceptions to the warrant requirement.

Specifically, his rights under the Idaho

Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated
when his jacket was searched incident to his arrest.
Prior to the search, Mr. Pedersen was handcuffed and secured away from the
jacket and, therefore, it was unreasonable to believe that he had access to the jacket or
its contents. Accordingly, Mr. Pedersen asserts that the State failed to meet its burden
of proving that the search of his jacket fell within an exception to the warrant
requirement and the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress.
This Reply Brief is necessary to explain why the State's position that the district
court correctly relied on State v. Bowman, 134 Idaho 176 (Ct. App. 2000), is incorrect.

1

The item of clothing was described as a grey, hooded, zip-up sweatshirt. (Tr., p.17,
L.24 - p.18, L.1.) The district court and counsel consistently referred to the sweatshirt
as a "jacket," thus all references contained herein will be to Mr. Pedersen's jacket. (See
Tr., p.17, L.20, p.79, L.14.)
1

The statement of the

and course of proceedings were previously articulated

in Mr. Pedersen's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

2

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Pedersen's motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Pedersen's Motion To Suppress
Mr. Pedersen asserts that his right to be free from unreasonable searches
protected by Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution was violated when officers conducted a warrantless search
of his jacket.

Because this was a warrantless search, the State bore the burden of

proving that the search fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant
requirement.

The only exception proffered by the State was the search incident to

arrest exception; however, that exception is inapplicable based on the facts of this case
the jacket was not within the area of "immediate control" of Mr. Pedersen as he
was ten to fifteen feet away, the jacket was being sat on by Ms. Nucha, and
Mr. Pedersen was handcuffed and in the presence and control of Officer Jagosh. The
scope of the area of "immediate control" under Chime/ is a radius that is to be
objectively determined by the district court, based on the facts of each case. Scott v.
United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978).

Thus, officers searched Mr. Pedersen's jacket

without a valid exception to the warrant requirement, where the jacket was not within the
area of "immediate control" of Mr. Pedersen under Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
763 (1969).
Mr. Pedersen asserts that the search was an illegal search incident to arrest
because the search was not justified by officer safety and Mr. Pedersen was being
arrested on an outstanding warrant, for which no evidence of the arresting offense could
be located within the jacket. As such, the district court erred when it denied his motion
to suppress.

4

State claims that the district court correctly concluded that "there was a

to

the officers" and a potential for the "concealment or destruction of evidence;" however,
risk to the officers from the handcuffed and guarded Mr. Pedersen was essentially
nonexistent:
To determine whether a warrantless search incident to an arrest exceeded
constitutional bounds, a court must ask: was the area in question, at the
time it was searched, conceivably accessible to the arrestee-assuming
that he was neither "an acrobat [nor] a Houdini"?
United States v. Lyons, 706 F.2d 321, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (internal citations omitted).

The jacket was not conceivably accessible to Mr. Pedersen, either to obtain a weapon
or to conceal or destroy evidence. Accordingly, its search was not permissible under
the "search incident to arrest" exception to the warrant requirement.
The search incident to arrest exception permits police to search an arrestee
following a lawful custodial arrest and is premised upon the dual purposes of:

(1)

protecting the officer and other persons in the vicinity from any dangerous objects or
weapons in the possession of the person arrested; and (2) preventing concealment or
destruction of evidence within the reach of the arrestee.

State v. LaMay, 140 Idaho

835, 838 (2004) (citing Chime/ v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)). Chime/limited
the scope of the search to "the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate
control,'-construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence."

Chime/, 395 U.S. at 763.

The

Chime/ Court further elaborated on the justifications underlying the rule allowing

contemporaneous searches through a discussion of the decision in Sibron v. New York,
392 U.S. 40 (1968):

5

Peters involved a search that we upheld as incident to a proper arrest. We
sustained the search, however, only because its scope had been
"reasonably limited" by the "need to seize weapons" and "to prevent the
destruction of evidence," to which Preston had referred. We emphasized
that the arresting officer "did not engage in an unrestrained and thorough
going examination of Peters and his personal effects. He seized him to cut
short his flight, and he searched him primarily for weapons."
Chime/, 395 U.S at 764 (1969) (quoting Sibron, 392 U.S. at 67) (holding that the
incident search was justified "by the need to seize weapons and other things which
might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to
prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime").
In this case, Mr. Pedersen arrived at his house and spoke to Officer Jagosh.
(Tr., p.42, Ls.16-25, p.44, Ls.4-21.)

While Officer Jagosh ran his information,

Mr. Pedersen emptied his pockets of valuables such as his wallet and cell phone and
took off his jacket. (Tr., p.46, L.12- p.47, L.20.) He gave all of the items to Ms. Nucha,
who was seated on a chair by the front door. (Tr., p.46, L.12

p.47, L.20, p.49, Ls.8-

11.) At some point she was sitting on all or part of the jacket. (Tr., p.66, Ls.16-19.)
Officer Jagosh then placed Mr. Pedersen under arrest by putting him in handcuffs, after
which he asked another officer to retrieve the jacket and other items from Ms. Nucho.
(Tr., p.50, L.13- p.52, L.5, p.59, Ls.16-23.) Officer Jagosh testified that Mr. Pedersen
was around 15 feet from Ms. Nucho when he handcuffed Mr. Pedersen. (Tr., p.50, L.22
- p.51, L.1, p.59, Ls.11-15.)
Officer Jagosh testified at the suppression hearing that Mr. Pedersen took off the
jacket and handed the items to Ms. Nucho while he was running Mr. Pedersen's
information through dispatch. (Tr., p.58, Ls.7-20.) The jacket was not retrieved and
searched until after Mr. Pedersen was handcuffed. (Tr., p.51, Ls.15-20.)

6

The district court denied Mr. Pedersen's motion to suppress, relying on the Idaho
rt of Appeals' holding in State v. Bowman, 1

Idaho 176 (Ct. App. 2000).

In Bowman, the Court of Appeals upheld the search of Mr. Bowman's jacket
incident to his arrest after he handed the jacket to a woman a few feet away
immediately prior to his arrest !d. 134 Idaho at 180. The Bowman Court found the
following facts determinative: there was one officer and three civilians, the arrestee had
"hastily" removed his jacket and was left standing in a T-shirt at 4:30 a.m. in January,
the distance from the arrestee to the woman holding the jacket was less than fifteen
feet, and the arrestee had not yet been handcuffed. /d. (emphasis added).
The State attempts to distinguish LaMay, while likening the facts of this case to
those in Bowman; however, the State fails to understand that the critical difference that
makes Bowman distinguishable from this case is the fact that in Mr. Pedersen's case he
was handcuffed. Similarly, the defendant in LaMay was handcuffed. The defendant in

Bowman was not handcuffed and thus there was a concern that he could lunge for an
object.
In denying Mr. Pedersen's motion to suppress, the district court attempted to
apply the test set forth in Bowman to the facts of this case, but it neglected to appreciate
the original reason behind the pertinent warrant exception-to protect officer safety and
to prevent removal or destruction of the evidence of the crime. Thus, the district court
neglected to consider LaMay, an Idaho Supreme Court decision that also utilized the
factors set forth in Bowman, but addressed a situation where the arrestee was
handcuffed and under the control of an officer like Mr. Pedersen was in this case. In

7

failing to recognize LaMay,

district court

arrestee was handcuffed or otherwise restrained."

the importance of "whether the
140 Idaho at 839.

The LaMay Court applied the Chime! standard and used the same factors used by
the Court of Appeals in Bowman to determine what is reasonably within an arrestee's
area of immediate control: (1) the distance between the arrestee and the place
searched; (2) whether the arrestee was handcuffed or otherwise restrained; (3) whether
police were positioned so as to block the arrestee from the area searched; (4) the ease
of access to the area itself; and (5) the number of officers. LaMay, 140 Idaho at 839. In
LaMay, the defendant had been arrested, handcuffed, and placed in a hallway under

guard. ld. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the subsequent search of a backpack
located fifteen feet away in another room was not justified as a search incident to his
arrest merely because the backpack had been in his immediate control prior to his
arrest.

/d.

The Court held that there were no exigent circumstances justifying the

search of the backpack without a warrant. /d.
Like the facts of LaMay, here the jacket had been in Mr. Pedersen's immediate
control prior to his arrest, but like the defendant in LaMay, Mr. Pedersen was removed
from the immediate vicinity and was also handcuffed and under the guard of law
enforcement. Mr. Pedersen was handcuffed and in the control of an officer, when his
jacket was seized and searched, and such is determinative of whether he had
immediate control of the jacket.

There was no potential risk of harm to the officers

present, as it was not possible for Mr. Pedersen to: (1) remove the handcuffs, then (2)
sprint away from the officer standing next to him and over to the jacket, then (3) remove

8

it from under Ms. Nucha, and then (4) access a weapon in the

enforcement officers who had

against

armed

on the curtilage of his home.

The district court, in applying the factors set forth in Bowman, appeared to place
equal weight on each factor; however, the fact that Mr. Pedersen was restrained by
handcuffs and under the guard of a law enforcement officer should have weighed
heavily in favor of suppression. Yet nothing about the test used by the Idaho Court of
Appeals in Bowman and the Idaho Supreme Court in LaMay notes that it is necessary
or even recommended, that the district courts give equal weight to each factor. In fact,
it makes no sense to do so, particularly where the test adopted by the Bowman Court
was merely a list of factors that the courts have historically used in trying to answer the
question of where it would be possible for the arrestee to reach. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH & SEIZURE S 6.3(c), at 306 (3d eel. 1996).

As noted by the LaFave

treatise-whether the arrestee was handcuffed "substantially narrows the area of
control." /d.
Mr. Pedersen would have had to be either "an acrobat" or "a Houdini" in order to
escape the handcuffs and the officer guarding him, and dash 15 feet over to his
roommate and then remove the jacket from under her and attempt to grab some sort of
weapon or contraband. Thus, the district court's conclusion regarding fact number four,
that there existed a "great ease of access to the area itself" was clearly erroneous.
(Tr., p. 79, L.25- p.80, L.21.)
Further, "a warrantless search must be 'strictly circumscribed by the exigencies
which justify its initiation."'

Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (quoting

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968)). Therefore, after the officers secured their own
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safety and restrained Mr. Pedersen, the justifications underlying

incident to

Mr. Pedersen was not an immediate threat to the officers as he was handcuffed,
removed from the immediate location, and under the control of an officer.

As such, the

State failed to show that the jacket was within Mr. Pedersen's immediate control as
required under Chime/ in order to justify the search under the search incident to arrest
exception of the warrant requirement.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Pedersen respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's
judgment and commitment, reverse the order denying his motion to suppress, and
remand his case for further proceedings.
DATED this 1st day of August, 2014.

SALL Yd. COOLEY ,;
DeputY State Appellate Public Defender
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